Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported on June 16 that Russia returned 1,245 bodies to Ukraine.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 16 that Ukraine repatriated 6,000 bodies in the last week.[2] Umerov stated that this is the final stage of the Istanbul framework for KIA repatriations. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia returned 1,248 bodies and received 51 bodies from Ukraine on June 16.[3] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Russia returned a total of 6,060 bodies and received 78 bodies from Ukraine over the last week.[4] The Russian MoD claimed that Russia is ready to return an additional 2,239 KIA bodies to Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia mixed Russian KIA bodies with Ukrainian KIA bodies during a previous repatriation exchange, possibly in order to intentionally increase the number of bodies that Russia was transferring to Ukraine or out of negligence.[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 that Russia proposed exchanging kidnapped Ukrainian children held in Russia for Russian POWs held in Ukraine, which Zelensky emphasized is “beyond international law.”[7]
Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments. The SZRU reported on June 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin personally decided to launch an information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling the POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit Ukraine in the international community.[8] The SZRU reported that the campaign leverages pro-Kremlin sources, including Russian milbloggers, and pro-Russian media sources in Europe to project emotionally charged content, manipulate statistical data, and portray delays in exchanges and repatriations as the deliberate actions of the Ukrainian authorities. The SZRU reported that the campaign will culminate in the final days of the POW exchanges, which are set for June 20. ISW assessed in early June 2025 that the Kremlin was baselessly accusing Ukraine of failing to conduct POW exchanges and KIA repatriations and was promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine in order to socialize Russian domestic audiences ahead of Russia’s possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage.[9] Russia has previously launched similar discreditation campaigns against Ukraine that aimed to destabilize Ukraine internally, such as the “Maidan-3” information operation, which Ukrainian intelligence reported in early 2024 sought to sow panic and discontent among Ukrainians and drive a wedge between Ukrainian society and military and political leadership.[10]
Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia’s increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of smaller Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on June 15 and assessed that Russia still has 46 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 42 percent of its pre-war infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) reserves, and 48 percent of its pre-war armored personnel carrier (APC) reserves as of a recent unspecified date.[11] The source stated that imagery of eight Russian military depots appears to show that Russia has emptied most of the depots of their vehicle reserves and assessed that Russia will likely deplete its remaining tank and armored vehicle reserves by the end of 2025.[12] The social media source assessed in late December 2024 that Russia had 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves remaining in storage.[13] (The source noted on June 15 that they updated their previous assessments of Russia’s pre-war reserves and found that Russia had 241 more tanks, 174 more IFVs, and 687 more APCs before the full-scale invasion than the source previously assessed, which likely accounts for the increase in Russian APCs stores from 45 percent in the December 2024 assessment to 48 percent in June 2024.[14]) The social media source also stated that satellite imagery analysis indicates a ”dramatic” increase in ”almost all” types of equipment deployed to a Russian military base near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, located roughly 373 kilometers from the international border with Finland.[15] Russia may have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27 that a senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending “almost none” of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the.”[16]
The social media source’s data suggests that Russia’s consumption of Soviet-era tank stocks has slowed in recent months, an observation consistent with ISW’s study of recent battlefield combat footage which shows that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian forces have been increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, mainly motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024.[17] ISW previously noted that Russia’s increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces suffered in late 2023 and 2024.[18] Ukrainian drone operations have significantly complicated how to tactically employ tanks, as large and slow-moving armored vehicles and tanks are vulnerable to drones. Russian forces appear to be leveraging faster-moving motorcycles and buggies to advance through the contested “gray zones” that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created along the frontline. Russia’s adaption has succeeded in granting Russian forces marginal tactical gains at the expense of significant infantry losses.[19] ISW previously assessed that Russian armored vehicle losses are unsustainable and are undermining Russia’s ability to sustain a protracted high-intensity war, but it remains unclear if Russia’s increased reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.[20]
Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Swedish news outlet SVT reported on June 16 that Planet Labs satellite imagery collected in May 2025 shows that Russia is developing and upgrading at least five nuclear facilities in western Russia and Belarus.[21] The satellite images show recently constructed test sites, fencing, loading quays, and storage and communications infrastructure at Russian nuclear bases in Kaliningrad Oblast and Novaya Zemlya, Arkhangelsk Oblast as well as at the Gadzhiyevo Submarine Base and a supporting facility at Olenya Bay, Murmansk Oblast. The satellite imagery also shows upgrades to fencing and railway infrastructure at a military base in Asipovichy, Belarus.[22] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson told SVT that Swedish defense services have been tracking these construction efforts, which indicate continued Russian investment in its nuclear capabilities.[23] ISW observed reports in March 2025 that satellite imagery showed that construction work on hangars for Iskander ballistic missiles in Asipovichy was in its final stage, and the New York Times reported in May 2024 that satellite imagery indicated that Belarus had been constructing facilities that could house nuclear warheads at a base 12 kilometers away from the Iskander storage site in Asipovichy.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.
- Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments.
- Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia’s increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield.
- Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.