The escalating violence against the Rohingya by the Arakan Army underscores the reality that, regardless of who assumes power, the future of the Rohingyas remains uncertain
The rise in deadly attacks on Rohingya people in Myanmar’s Rakhine State since May 2024 bears a chilling resemblance to the atrocities committed in August 2017, when the military forced Rohingyas to flee by attacking and burning down settlements. Nearly seven years later, similar scenes of Rohingya men, women, and children being slayed or escaping to neighbouring nations are unfolding, reflecting a continued erasure of Rohingya history and identity. Only this time, the preparator is an ethnic armed group.
The new conscription laws used to recruit the Rohingyas have become a key point of division against the Arakan Army (AA), a powerful ethnic armed group in Rakhine, who were earlier sympathetic to these people but now view them as pawns of the Junta.
Since November 2023, the AA has sought to take complete control of the Rakhine State and overthrow military rule, intensifying violence in Rohingya-populated areas. On 17 May, large-scale arson in northern Rakhine’s Buthidaung displaced thousands of Rohingya residents. Subsequently, on 5 August, an attack in Maungdaw, which survivors attributed to the AA, left an unknown number of Rohingya civilians dead. While the ethnic armed group has denied targeting the Rohingyas, evidence suggests otherwise.
Stateless community
The Rohingyas, a Muslim minority community in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, are considered “illegal Bengali immigrants” by the majority population since they are believed to have originated from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Act denies them citizenship, rendering them virtually stateless. As a result, they have been deprived of fundamental rights like education, freedom of movement, occupation, and even matrimony. They face random arrests, forced labour, and property seizures from time to time.
Historically, the Rohingya have held deep suspicion towards AA, which has been fighting for the autonomy of the Rakhine people since 2020, primarily due to religious divisions. The primarily Muslim Rohingya perceive the predominantly Buddhist AA as aligned with the dominant Bamar section. For its part, the AA has mainly maintained the famous and prevalent understanding that the Rohingya are a migrant population who do not belong in the country.
The military junta has seemingly exploited these religious tensions by forcibly conscripting Rohingya fighters and pressuring them to conduct anti-AA protests. Rohingya recruits have been used in attacks against Buddhist communities, stoking resentment. The violence conducted by the AA in late May is believed by some to be a retaliatory response to the alleged Rohingya involvement in earlier assaults on Buddhist communities. Thus, irrespective of who comes to power, the future of the stateless community living in Myanmar remains shrouded in uncertainty.
While some Rohingyas are still stuck and unable to cross to neighbouring nations, nearly 8,000 refugees are stepping into the already overcrowded and destabilised Bangladesh.
Government in transition
August has been a turning point for Bangladesh since student-led protests over reservation policies escalated into a major political crisis, leading to the resignation of the over-15-year-old Hasina government. An interim government under Mohammed Yunus, a Nobel prize laureate, also known as the father of microfinance, has been in power for over a month, still trying to stabilise an agitated nation.
Bangladesh has remained the most accessible destination for the Rohingyas since the 1970s when the military government in Myanmar first started its operation to oust these stateless people. Since then, successive attempts have been made in 1991, 2012, 2016, and 2017 to expel this population, who at most times sought refuge in Bangladesh.
As of 2024, Bangladesh hosts nearly 1 million Rohingya in 33 camps, grappling with space constraints and poor living and WASH conditions for the seventh consecutive year. Other challenges such as natural disasters exacerbate the poor living conditions In 2023, devastating fires and Cyclone Mocha left at least 12,000 displaced people without makeshift shelters. Acute funding shortages have led to food insecurity, as well as gaps in healthcare and education within the camps. Frequent fires and persistent human security concerns stemming from gang fights and trafficking issues, have grown.
For the smooth functioning of the camp areas, humanitarian organisations, though independent, rely on national authorities for permits, supplies, and security coordination. Bangladeshi bureaucrats, particularly in the Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, face ambiguity as many senior officials have gone into hiding or fled. With security forces preoccupied with internal issues, the Bangladesh-Myanmar border is now less manned.
Despite the challenges, the interim government has pledged to maintain Bangladesh’s policy of hosting the displaced Rohingya and repatriating them to Myanmar when conditions allow. In his mid-August policy address, Yunus reiterated Bangladesh’s dedication to aiding the displaced Rohingya. In September, Yunus appealed to humanitarian organisations, including the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), to increase its assistance for the displaced population.
Third country resettlement: A new hope?
The interim government’s initial change in stance earlier this month was a welcome move where the focus was shifted from the repatriation of the displaced people to Myanmar, where conditions are deteriorating with each passing day, to repatriation to a third country at the moment. Third-country resettlement efforts are being explored, with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and a few other nations among potential destinations.
Yunus’s fame and hold on an international scale are essential factors in attracting more international donors and may facilitate third-country resettlement. Earlier, the US, Canadian, Australian and Japanese governments received Rohingyas from Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand. However, the task may prove challenging now due to the immense scale of the Rohingya crisis, competing priorities for donor funding, and the reluctance of many governments to accept refugees.
Following the recent sideline meeting concerning this issue in the 79th UN General Assembly (UNGA), the US government has agreed to provide US$199 million in further aid to Rohingya and the communities within Bangladesh. The EU has allocated approximately US$39 million in humanitarian aid to Bangladesh for 2024, with an additional US$5 million in September to assist flood victims in Bangladesh, including the displaced Rohingyas.
While Yunus stated in the UNGA meeting that repatriation is the only option for these hapless people, Bangladesh must develop a medium-term policy to enable humanitarian organisations to operate constructively and manage the situation while actively exploring third-country resettlement options.
The interim government will also need to foster stronger international partnerships to sustain long-term support for the Rohingya, both financially and diplomatically. This includes advocating for more equitable burden-sharing among countries, and ensuring that Bangladesh isn’t left to shoulder the crisis alone. Additionally, addressing the root causes of the crisis by pushing for a resolution in Myanmar, including warranting the Rohingya’s safe and dignified return when conditions allow, must remain a priority. In this regard, as ethnic armed groups in Myanmar expand their control, they must also adhere to international humanitarian laws and permit investigations into crimes committed by both the Junta and non-state actors.
Simultaneously, Bangladesh should leverage regional platforms like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build consensus on the Rohingya issue and encourage greater regional responsibility in handling the crisis. ASEAN has faced criticism for its limited approach to this issue. Establishing a regional framework for refugee concerns is vital, especially since most member states are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. As Bangladesh seeks to become a sectoral dialogue partner within the bloc, engaging with Malaysia, the upcoming chair of ASEAN, on this issue will be fruitful.
While the Government of Myanmar continues to hold primary responsibility for safeguarding the rights of the Rohingya population, collective international efforts remain crucial to achieving a consolidated solution to the Rohingya crisis.Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
Link to the original article: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/road-from-rakhine-the-uncertain-fate-of-rohingyas