Myanmar’s military is upping its use of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) after suffering heavy losses from opposition forces’ use of the capability. Having purchased UAVs from China and Russia, the regime is now integrating these systems into its arsenal and its training syllabus.
After suffering multiple defeats at the hands of opposition forces using low-cost, uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), Myanmar’s army is now increasingly adopting a similar approach. It has been undertaking a buying spree of commercial and military UAVs, including from China and Russia.
While regime forces were initially slow to grasp the offensive value of UAVs and suffered numerous losses to UAV-equipped insurgents, they have now acquired large numbers of low-cost systems to supplement a far smaller number of larger UAVs. Operations with UAVs and counter-UAV tactics have also been integrated into the basic training curriculum provided to conscripts, according to sources close to the junta.
The opposition forces’ use of UAVs had jeopardised the military regime’s basic approach to counter-insurgency, which was largely based on the garrisoning of towns and occupation of remote areas where opposition forces operate. The regime, however, has been unable to deploy enough countermeasures to the thousands of outposts, bases, checkpoints, offices and the critical infrastructure now under threat.
The military government’s UAV inventory is known to include the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC) CH-3A. The air force has operated a small number of these for the better part of a decade, with only sporadic use against insurgents from around 2019. There have been claims it has also more recently acquired the larger and more capable CASC CH-4. The military has reportedly placed orders for the Russian Kronshtadt Orion-2 (Helios) and photos of the opposition forces released in July showed captured Russian Special Technology Centre Orlan-10E reconnaissance UAVs. It is uncertain whether any domestic UAV platform exists, although the regime’s Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI) does manufacture some UAV components. The DDI has also begun to manufacture ‘drop bombs’ for use with modified commercial UAVs.
Battlefield imagery suggests that more rotary-wing UAVs are being distributed to frontline units and vulnerable outposts, though quantities remain limited. While the regime has released some footage of UAV strikes, its propaganda efforts continue to lag far behind those of the opposition.
In addition to the regime deploying its combat aircraft for close air support, it has regularly used them to target opposition enclaves and civilians. Individuals embedded with opposition forces along the Myanmar-Thai border recently told IISS researchers that such airstrikes are increasingly carried out by UAVs.
Further deployment of UAVs could help the regime reduce strain on its air fleet, maintain pressure on opposition forces and their civilian supporters, and provide a tactical advantage to frontline combat units. But what difference UAVs will ultimately make amidst mounting battlefield losses remains to be seen.
Airborne insurgency
Myanmar’s opposition forces’ use of UAVs had emerged as a pattern by early 2022, with their application largely reflecting the asymmetric nature of the conflict. Simple UAVs were primarily used to carry out reconnaissance, interdict enemy columns, harass remote outposts and undermine the regime’s authority with attacks on administrative and infrastructure targets.
Resistance forces also touted UAVs as a response to the regime’s uncontested air superiority, disseminating UAV footage on social media for propaganda and fundraising purposes. In April 2024, long-range UAVs were used to strike Naypyidaw, the regime’s capital. Though nearly every UAV was shot down, the operation garnered international media coverage and allowed opposition forces to claim that the generals had ‘nowhere to hide’.
The type and quantity of available UAVs often varies by theatre. In the centre of the country, where local outfits are comparatively ill-equipped, modified RC planes and homemade or 3D-printed fixed-wing platforms are more common. In the borderlands, opposition forces have greater access to factory-made components needed to build rotary-wing UAVs, as well as fully assembled commercial and agricultural units.
The uptake of loitering munitions has been slow, with the first visual confirmation of their use recorded this year. Given the resource constraints faced by most insurgents in Myanmar, recoverable rather than one-way-attack UAVs are probably preferred.
In terms of military resistance to the regime, there are newly formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and better-established ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) which have greater access to arms markets and more money to either purchase military-grade munitions or manufacture improvised explosive devices at scale. Many EAOs integrate UAV operators directly into their unit structure, while PDFs adopt a range of integration styles. For example, some have dedicated UAV units, while others join coalitions with independent outfits that exist for the sole purpose of UAV production and deployment.
Towards conventional warfare
The role of UAVs in Myanmar’s civil war began to change in late 2023 when a trio of EAOs known as the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027, a highly successful offensive in the northeast of the country near the border with China.
After cutting off the main highway, Alliance fighters laid siege to dozens of isolated hilltop positions, which they then bombarded for days and sometimes weeks on end. According to the regime’s own admission, the Brotherhood utilised UAVs to drop an estimated 25,000 bombs during the offensive.
As the military’s network of fire support bases began to collapse, the Alliance moved on to capture battalion headquarters and urban centres. Over the last ten months, UAVs have helped the Brotherhood to wage direct assaults on highly fortified positions and expel the regime from nearly the entire northeastern theatre. Other opposition forces have attempted to replicate these tactics, but many lack the requisite capacity and firepower to fully exploit UAV technology. If the newer groups can make use of large inventories of regime munitions (mortar rounds) captured during recent offensives, this might shift the balance further.