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May 28, 2024

Institute for the Study of War: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2024

Institute for the Study of War

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 28, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin grossly misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian domestic law on May 28 in order to further promote the Kremlin information operation claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine. Putin claimed on May 28 during a press conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan that the Ukrainian Constitution provides for the extension of the powers of the Verkhovna Rada but “does not say anything about the extension of the powers of the president.”[1] Putin claimed that although the Ukrainian law on martial law prohibits presidential elections during martial law, which Ukraine was under for one month in 2018 and has been under since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, “this does not mean that [the Ukrainian president’s powers] are prolonged.” Putin cited Article 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which he alleged provides that “in this case…presidential powers are transferred to the speaker of the parliament.” Putin claimed that “the only legitimate authority” remaining in Ukraine is the Verkhovna Rada and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. Putin claimed that “if [the Verkhovna Rada] wanted to hold presidential elections, then the law on martial law would have been abolished…and elections would be held.” 

The Ukrainian Constitution states that “if the term of office of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine expires during the period of martial law or a state of emergency, its powers shall be extended until the day of the first meeting of the first session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine elected after the abolition of the state of martial law or emergency.”[2] The Ukrainian law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” prohibits “conducting elections for the President of Ukraine” while martial law is in effect.[3] Putin inaccurately cited Article 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution, however, which actually states: “The President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by impeachment if he commits treason or another crime.”[4] Article 112 describes how “the performance of the duties of the President of Ukraine for the period before the election and entry into office of the new President of Ukraine is entrusted to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.” Article 112, however, specifies that this transfer of power from the President to the Speaker only applies “in the case of early termination [emphasis added] of the powers of the President of Ukraine in accordance with Articles 108, 109, 110, 111 of this Constitution,” which describe how “the powers of the President of Ukraine are prematurely terminated in the event of their resignation, inability fulfill their powers due to their health, removal from office by impeachment, and death.” Putin’s baseless claim that the Verkhovna Rada could abolish martial law and hold presidential elections “if [it] wanted to” is also incorrect, as the law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” states that “before the end of the period for which martial law was imposed, and on the condition that the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity is eliminated, the President of Ukraine may issue a decree on the abolition of martial law on the entire territory of Ukraine or in some of its localities, which must be immediately announced through the media.”[5] Not only is the Verkhovna Rada not responsible for lifting martial law, but the Ukrainian President is also legally unable to lift martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine and pose a danger to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, as it clearly does.

Ukrainian Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk directly responded to Putin’s deliberate misinterpretation of Ukrainian law and explicitly stated that the Ukrainian Constitution and laws stipulate that Zelensky remain in office until the end of martial law in Ukraine.[6] Stefanchuk specifically drew attention to Part 1 of Article 108, which reads: “The President of Ukraine shall exercise their powers until the newly elected President takes office.”[7] Stefanchuk advised “curious readers” of the Ukrainian Constitution to not read “selectively.”[8] Putin observed correctly, for the first time on this issue, during his remarks in Tashkent that “this is a preliminary analysis” and “we need to take a closer look.”[9]

Russian allegations about Zelensky’s lack of legitimacy are a known Kremlin information operation that Kremlin officials have been promoting extensively in recent weeks, in part targeted at foreign audiences. Putin made similar claims rejecting Zelensky as the president of Ukraine during a press conference in Minsk, Belarus on May 24.[10] Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov also denied Zelensky’s legitimacy in an interview with Newsweek on May 25.[11] Putin’s May 28 allegations contain specific legal jargon and references – largely incorrect or taken out of their legal context – to the text of the Ukrainian Constitution and laws. Putin is likely purposely inflating his statements with such nuanced legalese language to make it seem that he is highly educated in Ukrainian legal matters and is a definitive voice on the matter. The use of such language is likely also meant to cause listeners to believe Putin’s false narratives without fact-checking, as legal jargon is inherently dense and opaque. The Ukrainian Constitution and the law relating to martial law, however, are not so opaque that a normal reader cannot understand them. The fact that Kremlin officials have recently promoted these narratives in detail at events in foreign countries and major Western publications suggests that this Kremlin information operation is largely aimed at foreign – predominantly Western – audiences.

Reuters paraphrased Putin’s statements under a headline that misrepresented even the thrust of Putin’s comments on May 28 but did not note the obvious errors in Putin’s claims.[12] Reuters wrote that “Zelensky has not faced an election despite the expiry of his term, something he and Kyiv’s allies deem the right decision in wartime” without offering the actual legal context that Putin’s comments misrepresented the Ukrainian legal framework that specifically stipulates that martial law remains in force, that presidential elections not be held during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine’s independent and sovereign territory and people and that Zelensky remains the legitimate president of Ukraine until his successor takes office.

Russian forces recently conducted four reduced-company-sized or smaller mechanized assaults on multiple operational axes in Donetsk Oblast without making significant advances, likely to test Ukrainian reactions following the first wave of the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Footage published on May 27 and 28 shows Russian forces conducting reinforced platoon-sized mechanized attacks east of Chasiv Yar and east of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka) and roughly-company sized mechanized attacks near Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and in Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[13] Russian forces only marginally advanced in the attacks east of Novopokrovske and in Staromayorske and did not make confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar or Novomykhailivka. Russian forces have reduced their tempo of attacks and advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast and increased their tempo of attacks in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction in recent days.[14] These Russian mechanized attacks – one across each of Russia’s current four operational axes – are limited in comparison to prior Russian mechanized attacks at the start of or during a dedicated offensive effort. The May 27 and 28 attacks were likely intended to gauge Ukrainian forces’ reactions and defensive abilities in the Donetsk direction. The recent Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast likely aimed to take advantage of Ukrainian manpower and materiel shortages before anticipated Western military assistance arrives at the frontline and create opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere, and Russian forces likely aimed to test whether and where any of these opportunities for exploitation may exist on the Donetsk Oblast frontline.[15]

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)’s Committee on Culture supported a resolution that recognizes Russia’s deliberate erasure of Ukrainian culture as an element of Russia’s genocidal campaign in occupied Ukraine, consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russia is pursuing a broad occupation strategy premised on eradicating Ukraine’s national identity and independence. PACE Committee on Culture Chairperson and Ukrainian Servant of the People Representative Yevheniia Kravchuk stated on May 28 that the PACE Culture Committee unanimously supported her resolution on “Countering the Destruction of Cultural Identity in War and Peace,” which the Committee will vote on in June 2024 and notably recognizes that Russia uses “cultural purges” as a tool of war in Ukraine that indicate “specific genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation by destroying Ukrainian identity and culture.”[16] Kravchuk emphasized that the resolution affirms that Russia’s cultural genocide in Ukraine is part of the wider genocidal campaign that Russia is pursuing against the Ukrainian people. If PACE’s Culture Committee adopts the resolution in June 2024, it would represent an important international recognition of cultural genocide as a constituent element of a wider genocidal policy.[17] International legal procedure has not yet created an official legal definition for cultural genocide, and it is not formally defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[18] The Genocide Convention, however, defines genocidal acts as those that intend to destroy “in whole or in part” a specific group, and Russia’s pursuit of cultural genocide in Ukraine is explicitly intended to destroy the Ukrainian nation and people “in whole or in part.”[19] ISW has reported at length on Russian efforts to destroy Ukrainian cultural, linguistic, and historic heritage in occupied Ukraine and completely supplant it with Russian cultural conceptions.[20] Russia’s cultural genocide in Ukraine cannot be viewed in isolation from its wider genocidal policy in Ukraine, as it is a fundamental component of Russia’s efforts to completely subsume and subjugate Ukraine and its people.

Russian authorities are preparing to intensify the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia throughout Summer 2024, further consolidating another component of Russia’s genocidal campaign in Ukraine. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced on May 27 that Russian federal subjects (regions that are constituent entities of the Russian Federation) will “host” over 12,000 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast over the course of 2024 and that the Russian “Useful Vacations” program will sponsor 40,000 children from occupied Ukraine to “visit” Russia for summer camps and educational activities.[21] Pasechnik also reported that summer camps for children in occupied Crimea and within Russia are preparing to “host” over 600 children from occupied Ukraine throughout the summer, including the “Okean” summer camp in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai (which is closer to Alaska than it is to Ukraine).[22] The Kherson Oblast occupation Ministry of Labor also announced that an unspecified number of children from occupied Kherson Oblast will travel to the “Okean” camp for an “educational, sport, and cultural program.”[23] Kherson Oblast occupation senator Andrey Alekseenko reported on May 27 that 575 children from occupied Kherson Oblast will attend three-week summer camps in occupied Crimea and in Russia’s Adygea Republic on Russian federal subject funds.[24] The LNR’s Ministry of Education and Science reported that an unspecified number of adolescents from occupied Luhansk Oblast will attend a military-patriotic sports camp at the “Avangard” camp in Russia’s Volgograd Oblast and train in military engineering, tactics, fires, parachuting, communications, national security fundamentals, drone operation, and tactical medicine.[25]

Despite Russian efforts to frame summer camps for Ukrainian children as temporary recreational and educational affairs, they are a fundamental component of Russia’s campaign to deport Ukrainians, including children, to Russia.[26] The forcible transfer of children from one group to another is a recognized act constituting genocide, and Russia’s multifaceted schemes deporting Ukrainian children to Russia may therefore be classed as genocidal acts.[27] Ukrainian children who have been deported to Russia for such “vacations” or “summer camps” face Russification programs premised on isolating them from their Ukrainian families, language, culture, and history.[28] Russian authorities will likely escalate deportation efforts throughout the summer under the guise of summer vacations, but these programs represent genocidal acts against the Ukrainian people despite Russian efforts to cloak them as temporary and positive educational opportunities.

Iran’s continued support for Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia’s technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published a report on May 28 detailing Russian efforts to produce Shahed-136/131 drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan using Iranian-provided technologies and a labor force recruited largely from eastern Africa.[29] WSJ cited the international hacking group Prana Network, which reportedly hacked an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) email server in February 2024 and revealed that Russia intends to produce 6,000 Shahed drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 alone. The Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) assessed that the Alabuga SEZ has already produced 4,500 Shaheds as of the end of April 2024, ahead of schedule, and could produce all 6,000 by mid-August 2024.[30] WSJ found that Russia is currently producing more advanced models of Iranian Shaheds domestically and intensively using them to strike Ukraine.[31] WSJ also noted that Russian authorities are recruiting from African countries, particularly Uganda, and especially enticing young women to participate in work-study programs at Alabuga to produce Shahed drones. Russia would not be able to operate the Alabuga SEZ without Iran’s consistent support for the Russian war effort—Iranian production models for Shahed drones and Iranian drone technologies are at the center of the entire Alabuga enterprise.[32] German outlet BILD similarly reported on May 27 that Iran has also likely supplied Russia with Qaem-5 television-guided air-to-ground bombs, which Iran started producing as recently as 2019.[33] BILD noted that an Iranian-provided Mohajer-6 drone carrying the Qaem-5 bombs crashed in Kursk Oblast for an unknown reason but that Russian forces may have intended to strike Sumy Oblast. ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has used these projectiles in Ukraine, but their use would be consistent with the pattern of continued and intensified Iranian military support to Russia.[34]

The Georgian Parliament overrode Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili’s veto of Georgia’s Russian-style “foreign agents” law in an 84-to-4 vote on May 28. Sixty-six Georgian parliament members spoke against the presidential veto.[35] The Georgian Constitution requires Zurabishvili to sign and publish the law within three days of the vote, but if she refuses, Georgian Parliament Chairperson Shalva Papuashvili can sign and publish the law within five days of the vote.[36] Papuashvili is a member of the ruling Georgian Dream party, which initiated the foreign agents bill, and will therefore likely sign the bill into law, as Zurabishvili will likely refuse to sign the bill into law given her initial veto of the bill. Zurabishvili addressed protestors against the foreign agents bill outside the Georgian parliament on May 28 and called on Georgian protestors to gather signatures to allow her to call for a referendum on the foreign agents bill.[37] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Georgian service noted that the Georgian Constitution allows the president to call for a referendum at the request of the parliament, the government, or at least 200,000 citizens, but that holding a referendum requires signatures from both the president and prime minister in cases when the parliament or citizens call for a referendum.[38] Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze would likely oppose such a referendum against the foreign agents bill. Kobakhidze claimed that the passage of the foreign agents law will strengthen Georgia’s sovereignty and improve its chances to achieve European Union (EU) membership.[39] The EU has repeatedly emphasized that the Georgian foreign agents law “goes against EU core principles and values,” that the law’s enactment “leads to a backsliding on at least three out of the nine steps” that the EU Commission recommended for Georgia’s EU candidacy status, and that the law negatively impacts Georgia’s path to EU membership.[40] ISW continues to assess that Georgian Dream actors likely intend to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[41]

A limited segment of the Russian ultranationalist information space has resumed its standard public criticisms of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and warned that new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov may not solve certain systemic issues within the Russian MoD and military. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor warned that any “emerging progress” from Belousov’s appointment and the dismissals of several senior defense officials may “not be allowed” to go far enough to address systemic issues currently hindering the Russian war in Ukraine.[42] The former Storm-Z instructor particularly highlighted the poor, incomplete, and short training of new personnel as having a compounding effect on other systemic issues, including “excessive and unjustifiably” high casualties, no troop rotations, poor tactical and operational decision-making, degradation of combat-experienced units, inability to preserve combat knowledge, and lack of command-staff accountability.[43] The Storm-Z instructor claimed that these issues are all interconnected and cyclical and that Russia has accumulated significant reserves that are not undergoing training due to these systemic issues.[44] Other Russian milbloggers, many of whom frequently complained about the Russian MoD prior to the mass MoD dismissals in late April-May 2024, agreed with the Storm-Z instructor and claimed that Russian “middle management” has been operating under the assumption that the current war in Ukraine is not actually a war, which is consistent with prior milblogger complaints that the Kremlin has failed to mobilize Russian society into a wartime mindset.[45] The Storm-Z instructor claimed that the fact that certain high-ranking officials, such as Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, have retained their positions further supports this complaint and that the appointments of new deputy defense ministers will indicate whether or not Belousov may be able to solve some of these systemic issues.[46]

The Russian ultranationalist information space has largely praised Belousov and the dismissals and arrests of senior Russian defense officials thus far. The milbloggers’ praise of Belousov and the dismissals comes with harsh criticisms of the corruption and ineptitude under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, representing a significant break with the self-censorship largely enforced by the MoD following the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023.[47] The condemnation of the MoD’s ineptitude prior to the dismissals and the resulting praise for Belousov’s appointment has largely benefited the MoD thus far as it helps rehabilitate the MoD’s image to Putin’s core ultranationalist constituency, secure their loyalty, and message to MoD officials that no one is safe from the consequences of falling from Putin’s favor.[48] The former Storm-Z instructor’s warning and resulting skepticism among like-minded milbloggers may represent the start of a return to prior complaints that undermined the MoD. The former Storm-Z instructor highlighted in his complaint that he was censoring himself throughout the conversation, suggesting that the MoD may not intend to lift censorship and self-censorship requirements on Russian milbloggers even if the bounds on what is acceptable criticism have shifted in the short term.[49]

Portugal and Belgium both signed long-term bilateral security agreements with Ukraine on May 28. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro signed a bilateral security agreement during Zelensky’s visit to Lisbon on May 28.[50] The bilateral security agreement provides for at least €126 million ($138 million) in Portuguese military support for Ukraine in 2024 and reaffirms Portugal’s commitment to Ukraine through various international cooperation platforms. Zelensky also met with Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo in Brussels on May 28 and signed a long-term bilateral security agreement with Belgium that provides for at least €977 million ($1 billion) in Belgian military aid to Ukraine in 2024, as well as continued military support for the next 10 years.[51] Zelensky noted that the bilateral Ukraine-Belgium agreement also specifies that Belgium will provide 30 F-16 jets to Ukraine by 2028, including an unspecified number sometime in 2024.[52] Belgium and Portugal are the eleventh and twelfth countries, respectively, to sign long-term bilateral security agreements with Ukraine.[53]

Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support on May 28 for delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia, indicating that Russia will likely do so soon. Putin stated that it is necessary for Russia to build relations with the Taliban because the Taliban controls Afghanistan.[54] Putin claimed that Russia is considering the opinion of each country in the region surrounding Afghanistan and will work with them when Russia considers whether to recognize the Taliban. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on May 28 that Russia is close to establishing “fully-fledged” relations with the Taliban.[55] Russia has maintained contacts with the Taliban since the Taliban deposed the Afghan government in August 2021, and ISW recently assessed that Russia may be hoping to leverage its relationship with the Taliban to degrade the Taliban’s adversary, Afghan-based Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which conducted the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.[56] Putin’s statement that Russia is working with the countries of the region when considering whether to recognize the Taliban indicates that Russia likely is following Central Asian states in normalizing relations with the Taliban.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin grossly misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian domestic law on May 28 in order to further promote the Kremlin information operation claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk directly responded to Putin’s deliberate misinterpretation of Ukrainian law and explicitly stated that the Ukrainian Constitution and laws stipulate that Zelensky remain in office until the end of martial law in Ukraine.
  • Russian allegations about Zelensky’s lack of legitimacy are a known Kremlin information operation that Kremlin officials have been promoting extensively in recent weeks, in part targeted at foreign audiences.
  • The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)’s Committee on Culture supported a resolution that recognizes Russia’s deliberate erasure of Ukrainian culture as an element of Russia’s genocidal campaign in occupied Ukraine, consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russia is pursuing a broad occupation strategy premised on eradicating Ukraine’s national identity and independence.
  • Russian authorities are preparing to intensify the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia throughout Summer 2024, further consolidating another component of Russia’s genocidal campaign in Ukraine.
  • Iran’s continued support for Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia’s technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine.
  • The Georgian Parliament overrode Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili’s veto of Georgia’s Russian-style “foreign agents” law in an 84-to-4 vote on May 28.
  • A limited segment of the Russian ultranationalist information space has resumed its standard public criticisms of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and warned that new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov may not solve certain systemic issues within the Russian MoD and military.
  • Portugal and Belgium both signed long-term bilateral security agreements with Ukraine on May 28.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support on May 28 for delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia, indicating that Russia will likely do so soon.
  • Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Lyptsi, and Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
  • The Russian military is reportedly intensifying efforts to recruit citizens from Central African countries to fight in Ukraine.
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Wilson Center

Forced displacement represents one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of our time. Individuals and families, torn from the fabric of their communities, find themselves navigating a world of uncertainty, often without basic necessities or a clear path to safety. There are currently some 110 million forced displaced, and this number is growing by 10 million each year!

At the heart of this crisis are the political triggers. Armed conflicts, ethnic or religious persecutions, and systemic human rights abuses force millions to flee their homes in terror. Many are displaced within their own national boundaries, while others seek asylum abroad. If these factors change as a result of political shifts at home or the pressures from abroad, they can return to their homes. Forced displacement is thus different from environmentally driven displacement, as victims of climate change may never be able to return to their homes.

The ramifications of any sort of displacement are profound, not just for those directly affected, but also for host communities and countries. Overburdened infrastructures, socio-economic strains, and cultural tensions can arise, necessitating comprehensive strategies to foster harmony and integration. Yet the root causes of forced displacement can be remedied with a concerted focus by local players and international diplomacy.

Organizations like Refugees International play a crucial role in this arena, advocating for the rights and needs of the displaced, conducting on-the-ground assessments, and influencing policymakers to take informed actions. Their relentless work underscores the gravity of the situation and the urgency ofinternational cooperation. But they, too, are overwhelmed by the rapid expansion of the crisis.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), with its core principles centered on the protection of civilians during conflicts, plays a pivotal role in this discourse. Yet, despite clear legal frameworks, compliance remains
inconsistent. This initiative emphasizes the importance of upholding and reinforcing these international standards.

It’s not just about recognizing the problem; it’s about active engagement. We urge governments, organizations, and individuals to prioritize the rights and needs of the forced displaced. Through collective efforts, informed policies, and sustained advocacy, we can shift the narrative from passive acknowledgment to proactive intervention.