Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia’s long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine. The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II (the chamber in charge of the ICC’s Ukraine-related investigations and prosecutions) announced on June 25 that it had issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for “the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects” in Ukraine. The ICC noted that there is reasonable evidence to believe that both Shoigu and Gerasimov bear individual responsibility for the war crimes of causing incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian objects and the crime of inhumane acts, both of which are violations of the Rome Statute. The ICC also emphasized that even in the case of Russian forces targeting “installations that may have qualified as military objectives at the relevant time,” the incidental civilian harm was excessively weighed against the expected military advantage—contrary to the international legal principle of proportionality. The ICC concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s military decision-making intentionally inflicted serious bodily harm and suffering on Ukraine’s civilian population.
Russia and Venezuela signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at countering “coercive measures,” likely to demonstrate to the West that the Kremlin holds influence in the Western hemisphere. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil met on June 11 during the BRICS summit and signed the MOU, which the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) described as an intent to develop a joint strategy combating “unilateral coercive measures” through informational channels and diplomatic means. Both Venezuela and Russia offered oddly limited details regarding the specifics of the MOU. The Venezuelan MFA announced the MOU on its social media accounts on June 11 but deleted the announcement from its official website, and the Russian MFA reported on the original Lavrov-Gil meeting on June 11 but did not announce the MOU until June 25. The MOU itself is also vague; the Russian MFA’s readout of the MOU does not define “unilateral coercive measures.” This Russian-Venezuelan MOU and Russian posturing in South America follows a Russian naval port call to and military exercises near Havana, Cuba on June 12-17, after which the Russian navy was rumored to stop in Venezuela. The Kremlin has recently indicated its interest in expanding cooperation with Venezuela, and the Kremlin likely intends for this new MOU to forward Russian narratives about a new multipolar world in a country that does not identify with the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) or alternative “Eurasian security architecture” rhetorical lines.
The European Union (EU) officially started accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova on June 25. Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib also noted that the EU Council has approved the draft for a joint EU-Ukraine security agreement in addition to opening accession negotiations.
Key Takeaways:
- Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia’s long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.
- Russia and Venezuela signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at countering “coercive measures,” likely to demonstrate to the West that the Kremlin holds influence in the Western hemisphere.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh Oblast on June 25 and recently conducted strikes on Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast with unspecified weapons.
- Russia imposed countersanctions against 81 European Union (EU)-based news outlets on June 25 following EU sanctions against four Russian state-affiliated news outlets on June 24.
- Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov ordered investigations into the personal records of senior Dagestani officials following the June 23 likely Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in Dagestan, indicating that the Kremlin may be intensifying efforts to address Islamist extremist threats in the North Caucasus as it attempts to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy.
- Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya on June 20 in Vilnius amid deteriorating Armenian-Belarusian relations.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Avdiivka.
- A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) will begin training unspecified Russian military personnel on October 1, 2024.
For full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024